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Pneumonic plague poses a potentially increasing risk
to humans in plague nonendemic regions either as a con-
sequence of an aerosolized release or through importation
of the disease. Pneumonic plague is person-to-person
transmissible. We provide a quantitative assessment of
transmissibility based on past outbreaks that shows that
the average number of secondary cases per primary case
(R0) was 1.3 (variance = 3.1), assuming a geometric prob-
ability distribution, prior to outbreak control measures. We
also show that the latent and infectious periods can be
approximated by using lognormal distributions with means
(SD) of 4.3 (1.8) and 2.5 (1.2) days. Based on this param-
eter estimation, we construct a Markov-chain epidemic
model to demonstrate the potential impact of delays in
implementing outbreak control measures and increasing
numbers of index cases on the incidence of cases in simu-
lated outbreaks. 
Y
ersinia pestis causes an enzootic vector-borne disease
infecting rodents and fleas; humans can also become
infected when exposed to zoonotic reservoirs. Infection in
humans usually occurs in the form of bubonic plague when
fleas that have previously fed on plague-infected rodents
bite them. Secondary pneumonic plague may then occur if
infection spreads to the lungs. Persons with secondary
pneumonic plague become infectious and can transmit the
disease to other persons by the respiratory route, causing
primary pneumonic plague (1,2). Primary pneumonic
plague is also person-to-person transmissible and can sus-
tain cycles of human transmission independent of flea and
rodent vectors. Bubonic plague can usually be treated suc-
cessfully with antibmicrobials; however, secondary pneu-
monic plague and primary pneumonic plague require
prompt antimicrobial treatment. Symptoms develop rapid-
ly and are usually fatal (1,3,4). The recent discovery of
antibiotic-resistant strains of Y. pestis (5) poses potential
new concerns for therapeutic and prophylactic treatments
during outbreaks.
The risk of importing Y. pestis to nonendemic regions
may have increased over recent years. The worldwide
extent of plague endemic-areas and the global incidence of
reported disease have both increased (6), as have the vol-
ume and rapidity of national and international trade and
travel. These factors raise the likelihood of importation
either through travelers incubating plague (as occurred in
New York 2002 [7]), or through importation of infected
vectors, such as fleas or rats. Imported vectors then have
the potential to initiate outbreaks of pneumonic plague. 
Plague is also recognized as a potential weapon for
bioterrorists (3,8–11) and has been used, or considered for
use, as a biologic weapon in the past. From the 14th to the
18th century in Europe, attempts were made to spread
plague in besieged cities by catapulting plague victims over
the walls (12). During the 1930s, the Japanese military
attempted to spread plague in China by dropping plague-
infected fleas from aircraft (12). As late as the 1990s, the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was developing plague
as an aerosol agent to cause primary pneumonic plague in
target populations (9). Recent training exercises in the
United States have been conducted to test the abilities of
healthcare systems to cope with large-scale aerosolized
releases of Y. pestis into urban populations (13,14).
Given that primary pneumonic plague is transmissible
person-to-person and outbreaks could occur as a conse-
quence of importation or bioterrorism, it is essential to
develop quantitative assessments of the transmissibility
and kinetics of the disease that are as robust as possible to
aid public health planning, including training exercises
such as those referred to above. Without preparation, inap-
propriate responses such as those seen during the suspect-
ed outbreak of plague in Surat, India (1994), are inevitable;
the tourist industry suffered, exports were affected, and
excessive demands were placed upon healthcare systems.
The losses in this case have been estimated to run into bil-
lions of U.S. dollars (15). 
While there has been much discussion concerning the
transmissibility of primary pneumonic plague, no quantita-
tive estimates could be found in published literature. The
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ably: some reports suggest that primary pneumonic plague
is highly transmissible and infectious (1,16–19), while oth-
ers suggest that it is not (20,21) or that intimate contact
between persons is required for transmission (22,23). 
Using mathematical models based on historic data, we
quantitatively assess the transmissibility and potential
health effects of primary pneumonic plague outbreaks
under a range of assumptions. In this initial analysis, we
consider only the immediate health effects due to primary
pneumonic plague and not the possible long-term effects
due to potentially establishing the pathogen in rodent
reservoirs and subsequent risks for bubonic plague. Based
on available epidemiologic evidence, the modeling
assumes that persons, once infected, experience a non-
symptomatic latent period followed by a symptomatic
infectious period during which they can transmit primary
pneumonic plague to other persons. Thereafter, if infected
persons are untreated they will die. The reported case-
fatality rate is close to 100% (1,3,4). 
To estimate the duration of the latent period and the
infectious period, and the probability of transmission of
primary pneumonic plague, data describing cases and
transmission events were sought from well-documented
outbreaks. Reports of sufficiently well-documented out-
breaks were rare, and each of the outbreaks resulted in rel-
atively small numbers of new cases of primary pneumonic
plague. Since therapy may affect the duration of individual
latent periods and infectious periods, only the data in
reports from person who had not received therapy was
used in this analysis for latent periods (24–29), and for
infectious periods (24,25,27,28). Lognormal distributions
were fitted to these data by maximizing the log-likelihood
function. In subsequent modeling, the duration of individ-
ual latent periods and infectious periods could then be
taken from the fitted lognormal distributions in Figure 1
with means (SD) of 4.3 (1.8) and 2.5 (1.2) days.
To estimate the transmission rate of primary pneumon-
ic plague, only those transmission events from reports
where the infecting persons could be unambiguously iden-
tified and where the infections had occurred before public
health intervention were included in the analysis. The
average number of infections generated by each infected
person was then determined for each of the outbreaks doc-
umented in the Table, which varied from 0.8 to 3.0 (this
variation most likely reflects the stochasticity that is inher-
ent in very small outbreaks—see also discussion below).
To obtain a stronger and more generalized estimate of
transmissibility across all of the outbreaks, probability
density functions (e.g., Poisson, geometric), were fitted to
these data by maximizing the log-likelihood function for
the probability and frequency of individual transmission
events aggregated across the datasets. The geometric dis-
tribution gave the best fit to the data (f(x) = p(1-p)x, where
x = no. secondary cases per primary case, f(x) = frequency
and p = 0.43), and predicted an average of 1.3 secondary
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Figure 1A. Frequency distribution for the latent period with a fitted
lognormal distribution (n = 224); B. frequency distribution of the
length of the infectious period with a fitted lognormal distribution (n
= 225).
Table. Documented outbreaks of primary pneumonic plague (PP) from which transmission data were derived 
Y and location 
Total of PP cases in 
outbreak
a 




prior to interventions 
Average no. of secondary transmissions 
per primary transmission 
Seattle, USA, 1907 (30)   5  5  4  0.8 
Oakland, USA, 1919 (24)   13  6  12  2.0 
Ecuador, 1939 (23)   18  4  6  1.5 
Mukden, China, 1946 (25)   39  9  8  0.9 
Rangoon, 1946 (31)   16  11  22  2.0 
NW Madagascar, 1957 (32)   42  35  39  1.1 
Zambia, 1993 (33)   3  3  2  0.7 
Madagascar, 1997 (26)   18  1  3  3.0 
aIncludes index case. 
bOnly includes cases in which the infecting person could be identified. 
 cases per primary case (R0) with variance of 3.1. This pro-
vides a probability density function (Figure 2) which was
used in subsequent modeling to calculate the expected
number of secondary cases per primary case for each per-
son infected with primary pneumonic plague. 
Documented 20th century outbreaks of primary pneu-
monic plague were often rapidly contained once they came
to the attention of public health authorities (Figure 3).
Even in the pre-antimicrobial era when outbreaks were not
specifically identified as plague (e.g., the outbreak in
Oakland in 1919 [24] that was thought to be a deadly form
of influenza), the isolation of ill persons and observation
and isolation of contacts were sufficient to rapidly control
the outbreak. Contact tracing and isolation tended to be
immediately effective because patients were infectious for
only a short time, were very ill and unlikely to go out into
the community, and any subsequent infections tended to be
in those already caring for the patient (Figure 4). Very
rarely were there cases where a prior infectious contact
could not be identified. In addition, modern antimicrobial
prophylaxis, when given in the incubation period, is close
to 100% effective for pneumonic plague, greatly reducing
any prospects of transmission from infected, but not yet
symptomatic, persons (3,22,26,34,35). The subsequent
modeling therefore assumes that once an outbreak has
been identified, further transmission will be stopped. It is
further assumed that a cumulative number of deaths are
likely to have occurred before an outbreak comes to the
attention of public health authorities and appropriate inter-
ventions are put in place, denoted D0. 
A simple Markov-chain model was used to model dis-
ease outbreaks such that an individual i would have a latent
period of Li and an infectious period of Ii, where Li and Ii
were random deviates selected from the appropriate prob-
ability density functions in Figure 1. The individual i
would then infect Ti susceptible persons, where Ti was a
random deviate selected from the geometric probability
density function described in Figure 2. As a simplifying
assumption, new infections were assumed to occur within
1 day of i becoming infectious, as new infections were
usually in close personal caregivers, few in number, and
the symptomatic period of short duration. The upper 95th
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Figure 2. Frequency distributions for the number of secondary
cases per primary case of primary pneumonic plague.
Observations from outbreaks in Table are in black and the fitted
geometric distribution in gray.
Figure 3. Epidemic curves for outbreaks in Table and from the
model. The curves plot cumulative cases at time of onset. Day 0 is
the time of onset of index case, the circles represent the times at
which disease control measures begin, those without circles
ended without public health interventions. Dotted lines indicate
missing data. The thicker black line represents the upper 95th per-
centile from the epidemic model, which rises roughly exponential-
ly to a value of 256 by day 35.
Figure 4. Distributions for the contexts of the transmission events
for PPP by (A) type of contact with infectious individual (n = 91),
and (B) location of infectious contact when infected (n = 86). Data
aggregated from multiple sources (23–26,30–33), where these
data were specified).percentile from the multiple iterations of the model with no
interventions applied is shown in Figure 3, along with the
epidemic curves for each of the outbreaks listed in the
Table. From the timings of the public health interventions
that are shown in Figure 3, it is clear, with the exception of
Mukden, 1946 (25), that the control measures were very
effective in controlling all outbreaks; any subsequent cases
occurred only as a result of infections incurred before the
initiation of the control measures. 
After the introduction of latent infections into a com-
munity, infectious symptomatic cases will begin to appear
over time. By the time an outbreak has been detected, there
will potentially be a number of infectious persons in the
community that can be estimated by using the modeling
procedure described above. This number is critical in esti-
mating the likely scale of response that might be required
by public health authorities, giving a guide not only to the
number of infectious people in the community at that
point, but also an index for further onward transmission
should responses be delayed. The model was thus used to
numerically estimate a function, given by equation 1, that
estimates the average number of infectious persons in the
community with the potential to infect others, I(t), at dif-
ferent times, t, following the initial introduction of differ-
ent numbers of infections (N0) into the population and
prior to control measures being applied (i.e., prior to D0
deaths having occurred).
I(t) = αN0eβt (equation 1)
where α = 0.3841 (SE = 0.00078) and β = 0.0734 (SE =
0.00005) for t ≥ 5 days.  The derived relationship does not
hold well for t < 5 days because of the delay until the onset
of illness in the first cases. In addition, it may not hold for
larger values of N0 and t where nonlinear mixing patterns
and depletion of susceptibles are likely to have an increas-
ingly large effect on I(t). A different modeling strategy
would probably be required to estimate the potential extent
of outbreaks for much larger numbers of initial index cases,
but such events are likely to be much less probable.
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Figure 5. Frequency distributions for (A) the expected number of
cases at the end of outbreaks, and (B) the expected lengths of out-
breaks when different numbers of deaths are required to trigger
public health interventions. The values in the square brackets refer
to the value at the upper 95 percentile value. For a larger repro-
duction of this figure, please see www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/
vol10no4/03-0509-G5.htm
Figure 6. Estimates for (A) the cumulative number of people infect-
ed from the time of the first infection, and (B) daily number of
infected people, where D0 = 1 (black), 5 (red) and 10 (blue). Solid
lines represent the median number of cases from multiple itera-
tions (n = 1000) of the model and the dotted lines give the upper
and lower 95th percentiles.The transmission rate derived here for primary pneu-
monic plague is relatively low compared to many other
communicable diseases (36), and in 43% of the simulated
outbreaks initiated by one index case, no transmission
occurred. However, the rapid onset of the infectious peri-
od (Figure 1) and the high variance associated with the
transmission rate means that if control measures are not
promptly and efficiently applied, in some instances much
larger outbreaks could occur. For example, for those simu-
lated outbreaks that did “take-off”, large numbers of cases
could result before interventions halted further transmis-
sion (Figure 5). Small changes in D0 considerably
increased the probability of larger numbers of total expect-
ed cases (Figure 5A) and extended the lengths of outbreaks
(Figure 5B). 
Where  N0 is large (e.g., following an efficient
aerosolized release of Y. pestis), the dynamics associated
with outbreaks will be considerably different than when N0
is small for 2 key reasons. The first reason is that for large
N0 the probability of transmission is more likely so that
natural epidemic die-off will be a less likely event. The sec-
ond is that outbreak detection will occur more rapidly as it
may not be necessary for multiple generations to have
occurred before D0 is reached. Thus, the changes in total
numbers of cases per outbreak due to the variation in D0 are
relatively smaller when N0 is higher (c.f. Figures 5 and 6,
and panels in Figure 7) because the difference in the time to
D0 occurring become less as N0 increases. Thus, for higher
N0, D0 becomes a less significant factor in determining the
total number of cases per outbreak. However, for large N0,
other factors are likely to impact on the control measures,
such as limitations in the capacity of healthcare facilities
and antimicrobial prophylaxis to cope with large numbers
of cases. For large N0 and larger ensuing outbreaks that
might exceed response capacities, the assumption in the
modeling here that transmission would be reduced effec-
tively to zero following outbreak detection would have to
be reconsidered in the light of resource constraints. 
Reducing the average number of secondary cases per
primary cases below one is a key step in controlling out-
breaks, as this means that the number of new cases
declines in successive generations of infection. Since the
value of R0 for primary pneumonic plague is already close
to one, the control of potential outbreaks in most cases
should be relatively straightforward and undemanding,
especially if started by relatively few initial index case-
patients. However, given that the upper and lower 95%
confidence limits for the estimate of R0 (based on the sig-
nificance of the χ2-values derived from minimizing the
log-likelihood function) are 2.3 (variance = 7.8) and 0.96
(variance = 1.9), outbreaks with higher values of R0 in this
range could result with greater probability in considerably
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Figure 7. Variation in the expected number of cases at the end of an outbreak when N0, D0, and R0 are varied across multiple iterations
(n = 27,000) of the model (red denotes R0 = 0.96, green denotes R0 = 1.3, and black denotes R0 = 2.3). (N.B. Note scale changes).
Total caseslarge outbreaks that would be increasingly difficult to con-
trol unless measures were implemented quickly and effi-
ciently (Figure 7). 
The fact that the estimated R0 is close to one reflects the
frequent qualitative observation (23–26,30–31,33) that
those infected tend to be those directly caring for ill per-
sons either at home or in a healthcare setting (Figure 4).
Given the close contact that was required for transmission
and that transmission actually occurred relatively infre-
quently, the predominating issue determining the variabil-
ity of transmission between outbreaks is likely to have
been stochasticity. This assertion is supported by the
results of the simulations, which demonstrate a range of
potential sizes and lengths for outbreaks even for individ-
ual mean R0 values (Figures 5 and 7). Although cultural
and other factors, such as social and healthcare structures,
may well have been different across the outbreaks that
have been analyzed, in most cases these factors probably
had a relatively minor impact. Although the transmission
rate of primary pneumonic plague appears to have been
consistently low across these better documented outbreaks,
stochastic effects could still generate significant outbreaks
by chance (Figures 5 and 7), which coupled with the rapid
kinetics of the infection means that such outbreaks could
also develop rapidly. In the sensitivity analysis here, how-
ever, even such larger outbreaks rarely exceeded more than
a hundred cases, even for the higher estimates of R0, N0,
and D0. Of course, this assumes relatively small numbers
of initial index cases (∼N0 < 10), relatively sensitive out-
break detection systems (~D0 < 10), and prompt and effi-
cient public health interventions (transmission tends to
zero immediately following outbreak detection). Thus, the
key element in the control of smaller outbreaks of primary
pneumonic plague would be the acuity of disease surveil-
lance systems and quick detection of outbreaks, the effi-
ciency of which might depend significantly on the number
of persons initially infected. 
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